AL-QA’IDAH OF WAZIRISTAN A TESTIMONY FROM WITHIN

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AL-QA’IDAH OF WAZIRISTAN – A TESTIMONY FROM WITHIN

By Abū Jarīr ash-Shamālī

I begin in the name of Allah. May peace and blessings be upon Allah’s Prophet who was sent with the sword as a mercy for all creation. May peace and blessings also be upon all his family, wives, companions, and righteous followers unt il Judgment Day. As for what proceeds:

In Jordan and its masājid of ‘Ammān, az-Zarqā’, Irbid, and other cities, I connected with some of the sons of these cities who called themselves Jamā’at at-Tawhīd. Nothing connected us to each other except for walā’ and barā’ which we learned from the Qur´ān, the books of tawhīd, what Abū Muhammad al-Maqdisī wrote regarding disbelief in tāghūt and belief in Allah, what others wrote regarding tawhīd such as ‘Abdul-Qādir Ibn ‘Abdil-‘Azīz (Sayyid Imām) – may Allah bring them both back to what they were upon of truth – and the older books of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibnul-Qayyim, and others. We learned from these books under the direction of senior brothers with shar’ī knowledge.

We quarreled with all the deviant groups such as “al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn,” “Jamā’at at-Tablīgh,” the Sufis, and others. Our matter became manifest, and thus we began to be transferred back and forth between the different departments of the intelligence and security services or be sent back to our homes to be placed under house arrest with security restrictions, and so on.

Abū Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī was the example of the muwahhid practicing jihād. He was the focus of all the brothers’ hearts. He was like an amīr for us. I did not see anyone in the arena who opposed this opinion or consensus. Before September 11th, we used to consider Tandhīm alQā’idah to be a jihādī organization with an irjā’ī orientation because of what had been declared in the past (the late 80s and early 90s) by some of its leaders regarding various apostate rulers – especially the Saudis – and their armies, and the hesitance of these individuals in declaring the apostasy of those rulers and their armies. [Editor’s Note: The presence of historical differences in ‘aqīdah and manhaj between Abū Mus’ab and the Tandhīm are indicated in the words of a top leader of al-Qā’idah – Sayf al-‘Adl – who stated, “The points of difference with Abū Mus’ab were not something new to us and were not unique, because hundreds of brothers used to come to us from numerous places of the world, and we would differ with them in a number of matters and issues. All of this was due to the different understandings of some aspects of creed connected to walā’ and barā’ and what is thereby necessitated in matters of takfīr and irjā’. The second matter was how to act and deal with the present state of the Ummah, every mujāhid in his region and original homeland. The most important point for Abū Mus’ab was the stance towards the Saudi rule and the method to deal with and handle it in light of the shar’ī rulings related to kufr and ‘īman” [Tajribatī Ma’ Abī Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī]. Note that Sayf al-‘Adl attempts to downplay the importance of these differences.]

We also considered the Taliban in Afghanistan to have shortcomings with regards to teaching tawhīd to their individual members. This deficiency caused many of their individuals to fall into shirkī matters such as circumambulating graves and wearing amulets. And sadly, these matters exist until now.

Abū Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī went to Afghanistan during the Russian occupation so as to repel the communist enemy assaulting the Muslim land of Afghanistan despite what he saw of shar’ī violations from the laymen of the people. For this reason, we as an assembly divided into two groups: one group that supported working in Afghanistan despite what was there, and a group that did not support working in Afghanistan.

Abū Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī returned to Jordan before the First Gulf War. He then entered prison after the end of the war for a period of 5 years. He was placed in the prisons of Jordan alongside Abū Muhammad al-Maqdisī over a case the Jordanian regime called at the time “the Bay’ah of the Imām.” He left prison and quickly packed and travelled to Afghanistan, remaining there until the events of September 11th took place. He remained there because the arena of Afghanistan was suitable for jihād due to the lack of kufrī regimes in control, the wide expanses of territory for the mujāhid brothers inside it, the ease of movement, and the abundance of arms for preparation and training. But – as it is known – America entered Afghanistan and occupied it.

After the American campaign started, all of the mujāhid groups withdrew and left the arena for other arenas, most important of which was Waziristan. It was full of different groups, creeds, and methodologies ascribing to jihād. They all took part in fighting the enemy (America). From amongst these groups was Tandhīm al-Qā’idah which had become famous because of its special operations, the most famed of which were the demolition of the towers in New York, and the attacks against the USS Cole, and the US embassies in Nairobi and Darussalam.

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In the late 90s, Abū Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī and his group of very small numbers had a center in the Afghan city of Herat – a city with a Rāfidī majority – far from the assemblies of the mujāhid muhājir groups. He did so to isolate his group from others at the time and prevent traffic from regular visits and thereby protect his group from intelligence infiltration. He also isolated them because of what he and his group was accused of by members of the other groups. They accused him of being takfīrī, Khārijī, and a person of extremist views.

As for the second group of brothers who remained in Jordan, then we did not support f ighting in Afghanistan (before September 11). Rather we considered it better for us to remain in Jordan and call to tawhīd, especially after a brother came from Afghanistan and described the condition of Afghanistan, the Taliban, and their shar’ī violations.

In the beginning of the new century, the Taliban of Afghanistan destroyed the statue of Buddha on the orders of the amīr Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar, so the souls began to yearn for the arena of Afghanistan, but because there was no way to go, the matter was halted by the conditions.

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In 2001, the American towers of Manhattan collapsed by Allah’s grant of success, via the strikes of the brothers in Tandhīm al-Qā’idah. If this indicated anything, it indicated the truthfulness of the soul of this man – Shaykh Usāmah Ibn Lādin – with Allah, and Allah knows best.

In 2002, I met the brother Abū Mus’ab azZarqāwī in Jordan and informed him of my intention to leave Jordan to the arenas of jihād anywhere. The Shaykh (rahimahullāh) prepared a route for me and so I left Jordan. On my way to Afghanistan, I was arrested in Iran a short t ime after the takeover of Baghdad.

Sometime after the attacks of September 11th, Shaykh Usāmah Ibn Lādin (rahimahullāh) explicitly declared the apostasy of the rulers of al-Haramayn and their soldiers and the obligation to fight them in some of his addresses. The obstacles preventing the unification of the ranks of the mujāhid muwahhidīn – az-Zarqāwī and his jamā’ah, and Ibn Lādin and his organization – were thereby removed.

Thereafter, in late 2004, while the legions of mujāhidīn headed by Shaykh Abū Mus’ab were attacking the Rāfidah, the Americans, and those alongside them from amongst the apostates and agents, the Shaykh announced his bay’ah to Shaykh Usāmah. This positioned us – Abū Mus’ab’s group in the prisons of Iran – to also give bay’ah. We had with us a group of brothers from Tandhīm al-Qā’idah in the prisons of the Rāfidah. They were there in prison when the brother Khālid al-‘Ārūrī (may Allah release him) and I were arrested. We, the members of Abū Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī’s group, Jamā’at at-Tawhīd wal-Jihād, gave bay’ah except for the brothers Khālid al-‘Ārūrī and Suhayb al-Urdunī.[Editor’s Note: These two brothers were from amongst the oldest companions of Shaykh az-Zarqāwī. May Allah release them from their imprisonment.] We did not hear any comment from them on the matter. It is possible that it was because they believed the Tandhīm was still soft in its handling of the apostate regime armies and because of differences they had with prisoners from the Tandhīm in Iran who did not consider the Rāfidah nor the jailers to be apostates.

Through the announcement of the Shaykh Ibn Lādin (rahimahullāh), our view of the Tandhīm changed from what it was before. The organizat ion was now a mirror image of what I used to see in the condition of the brothers in Jordan – Jamā’at at-Tawhīd. How much I wished to be released then so as to hug Shaykh Abū Mus’ab (rahimahullāh) for gathering the ranks upon tawhīd and angering the enemies by this bay’ah. The image remained in my mind as such. I was waiting for the moment to leave prison so as to live with the brothers in the arenas of jihād with the new and large organization I now belonged to.

And finally we were all released near the end of 2010, but the Rāfidah kept some brothers in their prisons, amongst them the two aforement ioned brothers who did not give bay’ah to alQā’idah: Khālid al-‘Ārūrī and Suhayb al-Urdunī. I believe that the reason for them not being released was the absence of bay’ah from them to the Tandhīm.

I went to the Pakistani city of Quetta and remained there for a period of 6 months, until I was permitted to enter the area of Waziristan by the Tandhīm. The reason for the delay from them was the severity of American strikes against the brothers in Waziristan. Therefore, my testimony covers what I witnessed and experienced in Waziristan after the passing of the amīr and founder of the Tandhīm – Shaykh Usāmah Ibn Lādin (rahimahullāh) in the operation carried out by the American forces near Abbottabad.

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The first surprise and major shock for me was that I used to think the area of Waziristan was an area completely liberated in which a person would travel east, west, north, and south, not seeing the armies of apostasy and not hearing a sound from them. I had thought the mujāhidīn were the decision makers there and that the shar’ī laws were implemented by them there. But alas and sadly, the dominant law was the tribal laws. To the detriment of the Sharī’ah laws, these tribal laws governed the people of the land. The Pakistani armies of apostasy covered every hill and mountain overseeing all clusters of people, and all villages and cities. This Pakistani army set up a curfew for one day every week, so as to move between its various zones and resupply itself with munitions and funds. If an irritating matter occurred to them, they would extend the curfew however they wanted.

If you wanted to travel from one place to another, you always had to stay away and diverge from the road so as not to get close to their encampments and not run into them. And their encampments are many! This would prolong your trip, make it difficult, and increase your hardship.

As for the condition of the mujāhidīn on the ground, then you would see the strangest of things! The chief organization – “Qā’idat al-Jihād” – supposedly had a great reputation which the eyes and the hearts of the good Muslim masses with sound fitar (plural of fitrah) yearned and waited for. They expected the organization to guide them towards liberation, rising up against their tawāghīt, the establishment of Allah’s law upon their lands, and to support their rights and aid their oppressed… But, we did not see any of this in that arena at all, for the Tandhīm was engrossed in categorizing the mujāhidīn of the arena into extremely takfīrī, Khārijī, and partially takfīrī. They would bring closer to themselves everyone who was deeply into irjā’ under the pretense of crushing Khārijī thought and expelling it from the Tandhīm. For this reason, the pyramidal organizational ladder leading up to the leadership was a ladder surrounded by a filter consisting of an intelligence apparatus of manhaj claimants. Thereby, no brother with proper manhaj who they considered to be opposed to them was able to change evil and announce the truth countering what the Tandhīm was upon of shar’ī and military mistakes. Rather, these brothers were dealt with through exclusion, ostracism, marginalization, and even defamation.

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As you know, the evil of the Rāfidah became manifest, especially their plots, their schemes, and their buried hatred for Islam and the Muslims from amongst the Sahābah, Tābi’īn, and righteous scholars. Allah exposed them and their wickedness. This media (the Rāfidī satellite TV stations) is just a clear and open proof exposing them, their deeds, and their accusat ions against our Messenger and religion. Their media will be a proof against us in the Dunyā and on Judgment Day for not doing anything against these heretics.

After a few days from me reaching Mīrānshāh, I was threatened and scolded by the amīr of the Shar’ī Committee of Tandhīm al-Qā’idah for using the word “Rāfidī” to describe Iran where I was held as a prisoner for a period of about 8 years. I used the word when I was asked about my condition, point of departure, etc., by brothers who would visit me after my arrival from my trip. I was then accused of being Khārijī and takf īrī! I was told by the amīr of the Shar’ī Committee at the time (Sālim at-Tarābulusī al-Lībī – rahimahullāh), “Go to Jordan and make takfīr there of whomever you want, and we will support you!” That was the second shock for me.

But I decided to remain and persist in reforming what I could. I began to speak with all the brothers in the Tandhīm at all levels regarding issues I would see in the arena. They were:

1) The arena is full of armed mujāhidīn and they have the ability to take control of the land, so why is Allah’s law not enforced upon it?

2) Why were the tāghūtī tribal laws (Jirga) and other laws implemented without any remark or even attempt to advise the people?

3) Why were there mujāhidīn entering and exiting the arena of Afghanistan via the Pakistani army when fighting the Americans?

4) Doesn’t the paving of roads between the cities and areas of Waziristan by the Pakistani government indicate that the Pakistani state had a mission in the region?

5) Why would the sons and daughters of the region enter the secularist government schools to a large and notable extent without there being any direction to or preparation for the establishment of school houses by the mujāhidīn, especially al-Qā’idah central, which had been very neglectful regarding the issue of schools and schooling for the sons of the mujāhid muhājirīn and ansār except for very recently when it was provided for a specific set of the children of the Tandhīm?

6) Why was there insistence on not delving into the shar’ī and behavioral violations and mistakes of the people, claiming that there was a shar’ī benefit in such so as not to turn them away or clash with them?

7) I requested from the leadership of the Tandhīm via their security chief and ideologue Abū ‘Ubaydah al-Maqdisī (‘Abdullāh al-‘Adam – rahimahullāh) to stop excessively praising the Arab revolutions or what is referred to as “the Arab Spring.”

8) We should gather the ranks of the different parties of fighters, unify them, and resolve any pending problems between them and the Tandhīm.

9) We should remove the women from the arena so that their presence does not become an impediment making the movement of the mujāhid brothers difficult in the case of sudden military action as such was expected. Movement is diff icult with them because of the high mountain elevations in the region. There also was no place of consolidation for them to stay in.

These points would be conveyed either via written messages passed on by the brother Abū Sālih al-Misrī (rahimahullāh) or by mouth directly to the brother Abū ‘Ubaydah al-Maqdisī whose responsibilities included being a middleman between the brothers in the arena and the leadership of the Tandhīm. Brother Abū Sālih al-Misrī was a close friend of mine while we were in prison together in Iran. Our relationship continued between us in Waziristan. Allah made this man defend me and cover me through his close relat ionship with the leadership of the Tandhīm. He was also my amīr in some special work we would do together.

The Tandhīm remained upon this condition, not hearing, not seeing, and not wanting to change, especially because it was like a secret society, and reaching its leadership was very difficult, except in rare cases like a visit from a leader to the camps in the mountain. It was to the point that a brother with a need, question, or grief, would not receive a response, and if he ever did, he would be fortunate. A response could arrive after weeks, months, or never. It was an impenetrable class system. The filter of the Tandhīm would filter everyone in the arena. Whoever did not oppose the methodology of the leadership would climb the pyramidal ladder. Sadly, I discovered that the methodology of Qā’idat al-Jihād after the death of Shaykh Usāmah Ibn Lādin (rahimahullāh) was the same methodology as that before his addresses in which he made explicit takfīr of the Saudi regime and its soldiers. So al-Qā’idah before my imprisonment was the same al-Qā’idah after my release. It was a methodology of irjā’ that refrained from many matters under the claim of caution or achieving benefit. The strangest matter was the hesitance in making takfīr of the Rāfidah of the era whose evil is not hidden from anyone whether distant or far. As for the condition of the Tandhīm during the period of my imprisonment, then I do not know what they were upon.

I wouldn’t advise them in a disparaging, defaming, or vehemently conflicting manner, because I didn’t think such would help achieve the goal. I thought that I would eventually find someone with ears or see some kind of change in the Tandhīm. But, sadly, no one would hear from me, not even from the second and third level of the Tandhīm. Instead you would see deterrence, rejection, refusal of the idea, and evasion.

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Abū ‘Ubaydah al-Maqdisī was a methodological man carrying “Qā’idī” irjā’ī thought, but he would not abandon dialogue nor discussion, rather he would listen, speak, and discuss. I used to think there was much good in him, despite how loud our voices would get against each other in the public and private gatherings, until I heard strange things from him including his statement that the Tandhīm considered atTantāwī (the former muftī of al-Azhar) and alQardāwī to be Muslim scholars and that they did not make takfīr of them.

At the same time, the Arabic magazine asSumūd released a statement upon the tongue of Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar Mujāhid in which he addressed the Islamic Ummah on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr 1433 AH and explained the future of Afghanistan after the departure of the Americans. He mentioned some clauses that impair Islam and – using a patriotic and nationalistic tone – called to respect of international conventions and borders, congratulated the nat ions of the Arab revolutions that changed their regimes, and asked the people who left those countries – meaning the oppressed muhājir mujāhidīn – to go back to their lands.[ Editor’s Note: The statement of Mullā ‘Umar referred to as well as others of his and his Emirate’s were quoted in the article of this issue titled “The Qā’idah of adh-Dhawāhirī, al-Harārī, and an-Nadhārī, and the Absent Yemeni Wisdom.”]

I would say to myself, where does Tandhīm alQā’idah – which fought America the caretaker of kufr and democracy – stand on this statement? Did this statement just pass by Qā’idat al-Jihād? And this statement came about after prefaces preceding it in the conference of Paris and the meeting with Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar’s delegate in Tokyo University where they spoke with the western world about the future of Afghanistan after the departure of the Americans and the new politics of the Taliban. This question persisted especially because the amīr of Tandhīm al-Qā’idah (adh-Dhawāhirī) used to repeatedly state that he had a bay’ah to Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar and called all the other branches and groups to do the same.

Many questions would arise in my mind.

I wrote a refutation of Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar’s statement and reminded the Tandhīm with the statement. Abū ‘Ubaydah al-Maqdisī had told me to write. I also asked Haqqānī’s faction who represented Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar in Waziristan. They told me to also write a refutation of Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar. So I wrote a refutation and sent a copy with Haqqānī’s faction to Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar. They told me that the response would reach him on Eid al-Adha. But sadly, no response came until now. I met the representat ive of Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar – Muhibbullāh – and gave him a copy of the refutation. Again, sadly, no response has come until now.

I looked around and did not find a place to go where I would see Islam truly with its laws established. The earth confined me. So I thought f irst to go to Burma to fight there. I asked one of my brothers and friends from the senior and eminent mujāhidīn in the arena, from the Punjābī brothers. He told me that going to Burma was impossible because of the difficult and long route and because of the tāghūtī and racist regime of Bangladesh. I then thought of going to Yemen. That was the plan I wanted to execute.

But I learned that there were brothers in northern Waziristan – Tahrīk Taliban Pakistan – in the area of Khaybar. They were upon great good. They carry the Salafī creed and hope and strive to establish the laws of Islam in their region.

I finally took the decision and went there on 26 January 2013. I reached the area of Kūkī Khayl on 7 March 2013. I learned about the nature of the land and its people and other matters that were not clear to me before. I learned about the different groups especially the different ones referred to as Taliban.[to any group appearing to be “students” even if they don’t belong to a single entity and even if they fight against each other.]

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1) Taliban Afghanistan such as Haqqānī’s faction. Their origins are Afghani. Their goal is Afghanistan, as they say. They consider Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar to be their top leader.

2) Taliban Waziristan who consider themselves to be Pakistani. They have many leaders including Qalbhadir, Ghulām Khān, Gud ‘Abdur-Rahmān, and others. They consider themselves the Pashtun of Pakistan. They work for their interests in the region even if to the detriment of all the other factions. They have a strong link with the Pakistani intelligence. They consider Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar to be their leader.

3) Independent Taliban in the area of Khaybar, northern Waziristan. They are strongly allied to the Pakistani government. They live off opium and marijuana production. They fight against Tahrīk Taliban Pakistan, and by means of weapons, block them from using the roads. They have many names, including: “Lashkar Islam,” “Ansār al-Islām,” [Editor’s Note: The group has no relation with Ansār al-Islām of Iraq.] “Jamā’at at-Tawhīd,” “Munghul Bāgh,” and others.

4) Tahrīk Taliban Pakistan are migrants from the regions that the Pakistani army entered in Wādī Swāt and other areas near Peshawar. They are perhaps the best group present in the Waziristan arena. But sadly, the Pakistani intelligence was able to infiltrate some of its individuals and incite some of their tribal leaders against one another and towards fighting each other over issues of leadership. They consist of tribal assemblies, each assembly having its own leader. They had established the shar’ī laws in Wādī Swāt before my arrival to Waziristan, and very quickly Tandhīm al-Qā’idah sent a Pashtun man named Muftī Hasan to meet the Tahrīk and convince them to not rush into establishing the shar’ī laws, for the sake of the greater, general good… When Muftī Hasan met Shaykh Maqbūl (the muftī of the Tahrīk), Shaykh Maqbūl convinced him in the soundness of establishing the shar’ī laws at that time. So Muftī Hasan returned with new ideas and posed them to Tandhīm alQā’idah, but he was recompensed with expulsion from the Tandhīm. He is now a member of Tahrīk Taliban Pakistan. These events were narrated to me by some of the leaders of the Tahrīk who witnessed them.

The Pakistani government was able to incite all the different Taliban factions against the Tahrīk in the areas of their presence in northern Waziristan, as it was expected that Tahrīk Taliban would gain control over the region.

The Tahrīk was able to enter and liberate the largest area of northern Waziristan called Mīdān (the area controlled by Taliban “Ansar al-Islām” [Editor’s Note: See previous note.] allied to the Pakistani regime and whose leader is Mahbūb al-Haqq), after raiding the area. Terror quickly entered the hearts of the Pakistani army troops and their allies, and so they quickly f led without fighting. We were there for three months before the army began to bombard the area. Mīdān then became a shooting ground for the Pakistani army and a warzone defiled by the army’s shelling. We then withdrew from Mīdān back to Kūkī Khayl and Tūrā Dārā. The army then entered Mīdān, achieving a victory by which it damaged its strongest enemy force (the Tahrīk) and expelled them from the area.

The government program thereafter was to move south into central Waziristan, the areas of Mīrānshāh, Mīr ‘Alī, and other areas where muhājir mujāhidīn were present… areas which were almost empty of mujāhidīn because of their departure from the arena to other arenas. Tandhīm al-Qā’idah was responsible for this departure. I hold the amīr of Tandhīm al-Qā’idah and everyone who beautifies and supports his deeds responsible for the evacuation of the arena.

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Tahrīk Taliban Pakistan are from the best of mujāhidīn who I saw in the arena. They are upon great good. Most of their leaders have a sound creed and are upon the methodology of the Salaf – we consider them as such. As for their laymen, then they have some issues because of their lower degree of shar’ī knowledge and their madhhabī bias.

Their leader Fadlullāh met Mullā ‘Umar more than 15 years ago and gave him bay’ah at the t ime. Mullā ‘Umar gave him his own turban as a gift. He is loyal to Mullā ‘Umar until today despite what Mullā ‘Umar has of significant shar’ī mistakes which Fadlullāh is not aware of.

I decided to go back to Mīrānshāh to convey to the remaining brothers in Tandhīm al-Qā’idah and the leadership – out of a sense of honor and desire to advise them – after I resolved to leave from northern Waziristan and enter Afghanistan so as to completely exit the arena. But Allah prepared for me something better. So I went back to central Waziristan.

When I arrived to Mīrānshāh, I wrote a message to Lajnat Bukhārā (the Committee of Bukhārā – an administrative committee belonging to the leadership of al-Qā’idah set up after the killings of ‘Atiyyatullāh and Abū Yahyā al-Lībī, rahimahumullāh). I explained what had happened and explained my view on the near future of Waziristan and the inevitable entrance of the Pakistani army into the central regions after it completes its domination of the north. I attached to the message a copy of the refutation I wrote against the previous address of Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar to remind the brothers that the arena was now between the hammer of nationalism and anvil of tribalism in Afghanistan and Waziristan. Sadly, I did not receive any response from the Tandhīm about this statement.

A number of matters occurred in the arena during my six-month absence in the north. These matters put the Tandhīm on the brink of extinction. The most significant was the case of the sons of brothers in the Tandhīm, sons of shuhadā’ (we consider them as such), sons of leaders. These sons fell into fāhishah (sodomy), leading them into espionage (as happened before in Sudan with others). Their treachery led to tens of airstrikes killing many brothers. We moved against the silence of the Tandhīm and put pressure on them to set up a trial by the Tandhīm independent of the Emirate of Afghanistan. But the Tandhīm insisted upon its stance of bringing a judge from the Emirate, claiming the Tandhīm belonged to the Emirate and had bay’ah to it. Our request of a trial set up by the Tandhīm and independent of the Emirate was because of the differences between us and the Emirate – due to its madhhabī bias – on the punishment for espionage and sodomy.[ Editor’s Note: The judges of the Emirate are Deobandi (Māturīdī Hanafī). They have irjā’ in ruling upon “Muslim” spies who apostatize by aiding the kuffār against the Muslims. They also have less severe punishments for this wicked deed as well as the sin of sodomy in comparison to other schools of f iqh. Essentially, the Tandhīm’s insistence on referring the matter back to the Emirate was to prevent the execution of the suspects. For this reason, the author and his brothers requested a trial administered by the Tandhīm and independent of the Emirate.]

The Emirate refused to delve into the matter and instead referred it back to the Tandhīm.[ Editor’s Note: The Tandhīm thereby no longer had the excuse of being under the wing of the Emirate to avoid judging directly in the matter.] The story of the youth involved in the case spread everywhere, turning the Tandhīm into a joke. Questions began to be asked by the mujāhidīn and the people. Why did the Tandhīm delay ruling in their case? Why does the Tandhīm insist upon doing so? Why did the Tandhīm release the suspects in the case from prison before a judgment was passed?

At the same time, brothers reached us from northern Afghanistan to Mīrānshāh on their way to the Islamic State. At that point, the State became the focus of eyes and questions, for I had not heard much about it before. I did not know a lot about it because of the weakness of

the internet in the region. It is very slow and complicated. The only source of information on the arena in Shām was the Tandhīm itself. They would not show anyone anything about the State. It was as if it was nonexistent. Also, when the Islamic State of Iraq was announced by Amīrul-Mu’minīn Abū ‘Umar al-Baghdādī (rahimahullāh), the spotlight was not focused on it. The kufrī media would completely hide it from vision. We were also at the time imprisoned in Iran, cut off from the world completely. It appeared to us as being a small group or organization with occasional actions appearing here and there, only to have the curtain drop upon its actions. Even when the State carried on under the leadership of Amīrul-Mu’minīn Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī (hafidhahullāh), prison was an obstacle as well as the scarce media information coming from or about it.

Sadly, even when the State entered Shām via its front, Jabhat an-Nusrah, the Ummah did not know of this because of the security and media program of the State. The matters got worse and made it more complicated and hazy. Also, the issue of our conflict with the Tandhīm in the arena of Waziristan was a cause for me not to pay attention to what in reality was going on in Syria.

But Allah blessed me with the arrival of brothers from northern Waziristan with experience in using the internet. May Allah reward them with good. The picture began to become clearer for me as well as the sharp vision and manifest truth of the Islamic State. This Islamic State was – by Allah’s grace – a gift from Allah that was an alternative to the chaos afflicting the arena at the time.

The conflict with the Tandhīm became more severe. We wrote letters to the Tandhīm encouraging them to judge in the case of the suspects. After putting pressure on them and inciting them with a letter of harsh tone directed to Lajnat Bukhārā, the head of the committee and one of its members – al-Bāshā (al-Bahtītī) – met me. During the meeting, he expressed his refusal to establish a trial independent of the Emirate, away from madhhabī bias. He said on the issue of the case, that it was foolish to establish a trial for the charged individuals because such was not based in wisdom and because the suspects would not admit to their crimes, and therefore the accusers would be flogged instead… The accusers were the head of the Security Committee and his assistant. Then after much tugging and pulling, requesting the suspects be returned to prison and put on trial, he said to get out of the tough spot he was in, “We will gather them all. That is easy. Then we will put them on trial. Then we will release them.”

The meeting ended finally with al-Bāshā agreeing to convince the brothers in Lajnat Bukhārā to re-arrest the suspects and put them on trial. At the same time, the subject of the Islamic State began to react with what was taking place on the ground (the Islamic State had consolidation and established the laws contrary to the condition of the Tandhīm). The issue of the suspects began to reach a dead end because the Tandhīm declared its fear of the suspects’ mothers, saying they might contact the foreign media or hold protests in the streets of Mīrānshāh and incite the people against the Tandhīm. Al-Bāshā then said that the Tandhīm could no longer handle this.

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The issue of al-Jawlānī and his betrayal of his amīr began to be discussed and the picture began to become clearer alongside what was transpiring with the Tandhīm.

In retrospect, it’s clear to me that the evacuation of the Waziristan arena was intentionally done by the Tandhīm. I remember how Abū ‘Ubaydah al-Maqdisī, in the beginning of the jihādī action in Syria, would place his hand in the hands of the muhājir going to Syria and ask him to give bay’ah that he would go to Jabhat an-Nusrah, at the time when Jabhat an-Nusrah still had not broken off from the State and there were not many groups yet in the arena. The most prominent groups were the Asad regime, the Free Syrian Army, and Jabhat an-Nusrah. This was a puzzle to me, which I did not understand at the t ime. Why would one ask the mujāhid leaving for Shām to give bay’ah to Jabhat an-Nusrah when his own words speak loudly that he would not go anywhere else? Abū ‘Ubaydah al-Maqdisī would repeatedly make the statement, “We want to establish a place for us in that arena.” It was as if he wanted to bind the mujāhid to Jabhat an-Nusrah as some plot was being crafted by the Tandhīm for the future.

What al-Jawlānī did thereafter, including his refusal to accept the expansion of the Islamic State into Shām, was only an obvious plot from Ayman adh-Dhawāhirī and his cronies who left from the arena of Waziristan carrying secret and private messages implicating adh-Dhawāhirī with al-Jawlānī in their attempt to make a place for Tandhīm al-Qā’idah in Shām at the expense of the Islamic State. What proves this is the immediate acceptance of Jawlānī’s bay’ah by adh-Dhawāhirī. Adh-Dhawāhirī also asked the amīr of the Islamic State to return to Iraq “in exchange” for his “recognition” of al-Baghdādī being Amīrul-Mu’minīn and his state an Islamic state. All this if Amīrul-Mu’minīn returned to Iraq, otherwise his state would be Khārijī and he would not “recognize” him to be AmīrulMu’minīn.

Adh-Dhawāhirī then continually appeared in the media displaying himself to be a gentle lamb on the issue of the State and the bay’ah and insisted upon having “the right” for leadership and “the obligation” to be listened to and obeyed. He began to describe the State and its leader as having the worst traits until the State became the target for everyone who carried arms in Shām and had entered into the maze of adh-Dhawāhirī’s ideas after he caught many people in the traps of his twisted thinking. His ideas contradict jihād and the carrying of arms, and encourage pacifist methodologies [never-ending protests] and the seeking of popular support, all of which led to the new Pharaohs’ takeover of Egypt and other countries.

Many women, children, and men were killed for no reason. They could not do anything except go to the roads, squares, and plazas, practicing the new politics that adh-Dhawāhirī called to and those like him who claimed that what the protestors practice is the real jihād which will change oppression into justice and kufr into Islam. Because of him, truth is no longer as clear from falsehood. The tāghūt [Morsi] is praised and supplications are made for him, and the truth and its people are criticized. He thereby destroyed Tandhīm al-Qā’idah.

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At the same time, the Tandhīm did not gather the suspects of the aforementioned crime [espionage and sodomy]. Rather, they made a special camp for them amongst the camps of the Tandhīm called Katībat Usāmah Ibn Zayd (radiyallāhu ‘anh). The two spies – sons of two leaders of the Tandhīm – from amongst the suspects were killed by the Security Committee after it witnessed the disregard from the leadership of the Tandhīm for their case. This stirred an uproar, which has not settled since in the Tandhīm, despite the fact the Security Committee killed them after Siddīqullāh’s faction with the help of Gud ‘Abdur-Rahmān’s faction – who is linked to the Pakistani intelligence and who had a role in recruiting the two spies – tried to free them from prison. The Security Committee was expelled from the Tandhīm, removed from the field, and forced to remain in their homes.

Because of the constant pressure upon the Tandhīm from the Security Committee and many brothers, the Tandhīm was forced to present the case to the brother Abū Mālik at-Tamīmī who reached Mīrānshāh coming from Afghani Nūristān on his way to the Islamic State. The brother Abū Mālik judged that the blood of the two dead spies was lawfully spilled.

I and a number of brothers from amongst those who would later go on to sign the declaration of our bay’ah to the Islamic State prior to my hijrah to Shām, resolved to wage war against Tandhīm al-Qā’idah by exposing it after all the paths leading to a resolution with it were closed. We – Arabs and non-Arabs, muhājirīn and ansār alike – began by inquiring about what was taking place in the arena, and we made a list of questions for the Tandhīm so that it could respond to them and so that these responses would be the final junction ending our relationship with the Tandhīm.

The Tandhīm tried to defuse the anger that we had by purchasing our hearts with positions and wealth, but by Allah’s grace, they failed. As for the requests that were put forward, they were:

1) That the Tandhīm writes out its ‘aqīdah, particularly concerning the Rawāfid.

2) A shar’ī justification for adh-Dhawāhirī’s du’ā’ for the tāghūt Morsi.

3) The reason for adh-Dhawāhirī accusing the Islamic State of being Khārijī.

4) The reason for changing the course of the jihād from being that of fighting to being peaceful demonstrations and in pursuit of popular support.

There came no response to these inquiries, even up until the last mujāhid had left the area of Mīrānshāh, which the Pakistani army had entered and closed off in June of 2014. At that point, in time, when we had given the Tandhīm ample t ime to rethink and backtrack from its mistakes and transgresses, adh-Dhawāhirī was, unfortunately, leading the Tandhīm to the bottom of the pit, even up until the writing of this article.

We disassociated ourselves from Tandhīm alQā’idah and from the shar’ī lapses of adhDhawāhirī, and gave bay’ah to the Islamic State and its amīr, Amīrul-Mu’minīn Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī. This was due to what we saw of consolidation for Tawhīd and Sharī’ah, which was what we had been searching for and what a person’s soul yearns for and what delights the heart and puts the mind at ease, announcing from within the end of the journey in search for the truth, the correct path of jihād, the path of the jamā’ah that would take one to al-Firdaws, bi idhnillāh.

Yes, we gave bay’ah to Amīrul-Mu’minīn Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī after I already had a bay’ah of imārah to Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar and also had bay’ah to Shaykh Usāmah and likewise Dr. Ayman adhDhawāhirī, but only because of Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar and Dr. Ayman adh-Dhawāhirī’s nullification of the conditions of the bay’ah by what Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar wrote in his disastrous messages to the Muslims on the occasions of the Islamic Eid celebrations. As for adh-Dhawāhirī, then it was through his refusal to implement the shar’ī laws (due to flimsy arguments such as the alleged “benefit”) and insisting on that, and turning a blind eye to his amīr Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar’s dangerous shar’ī violations. And because of that I’m not to be blamed, and they have no right upon me to listen and obey.

So the Tandhīm became like a raging bull stumbling about, and its cronies spread out and went to every place and began meeting with everyone, mujāhidīn and non-mujāhidīn alike, and groups and individuals alike, in a desperate attempt to save a drowning entity struggling to breathe in deep water as it is exhausted and fat igued by tiredness and the struggle in the water.

They fabricated lies against us and described us in the harshest of ways: takfīrī, Khawārij, killers of Muslims, Wahhābī… and they would warn the people that we were murderers and that we’d slaughter them.

Tandhīm al-Qā’idah then began playing the chords of madhhab partisanship, particularly because the people are upon the Hanafī madhhab. They also claimed that with this bay’ah we were declaring war on them, on their madhhab, and on their amīr, and that our presence in the arena as soldiers of the Islamic State was in def iance of them and their amīr.

By Allah’s grace, the people began to flock towards us to search for answers to many quest ions, some for obtaining information and others to gain clarification on some shubuhāt that the Tandhīm would spread amongst them.

Some of the brothers – may Allah reward them – began communicating through the Internet, obtaining pictures taken from within the Islamic State, showing them to the people, and showing them the video releases in restaurants and coffee shops. This would be a da’wah for them and a means of shedding light on the Islamic State, the true jihād that it’s waging, and the conquests that Allah has granted it. This had a positive effect on both the Ansār and the people in general. And this, by Allah’s grace, contributed to shaking the Tandhīm and to the people ignoring its video releases, which were hollow anyways.

Likewise, the mujāhid groups in the arena started discussing the Tandhīm’s proposals concerning pacifism and popular support, the jihād that the Islamic State is waging, and the notion that the Tandhīm’s idea of peaceful demonstrations at the expense of jihād would neither eliminate a tāghūt nor remove injustice from the necks of the people. Rather, it was a major source of corruption. And what occurred instead was the killing of women and children in the public squares and on the streets at the hands of the soldiers and policemen of the tawāghīt without their killers paying a price for their actions. In fact, this idea is what is creating the new Pharaohs.

Al-Qā’idah’s cronies raised their voices, declaring war with neither fear nor shame, for the Tandhīm immediately cut off stipends from the families of the brothers who had signed the declaration of bay’ah without any consideration for the presence of women, children, and the sick. Thus, the wealth that generous people were donating to alQā’idah and its members in order for them to wage jihād and so that Allah would accept from the their sadaqāt, was now cut off by adh-Dhawāhirī from those who deserved it for no reason other than their desire for the truth and for supporting the truth and establishing the religion. Instead, adh-Dhawāhirī used it to wage war against the truth and its people, subhānallāh! He will meet Allah in that condition if he does not repent and turn back from what he is upon. And there is no barrier between Allah and the du’ā’ of the oppressed.

Tandhīm al-Qā’idah didn’t stop there. Rather, its men went to the Uzbek group (Tāhir Jān’s group) and their amīr ‘Uthmān despite the existence of a major rift between them because of the fighting that took place in the city of Wānā in late 2008. Tandhīm alQā’idah, at the time, dropped their support for the group when the Uzbeks fought the Pakistani army and its ally Nadhīr, arguing that the Uzbeks were takfīrī, Khawārij, and extremists, which led to many of the Uzbeks being killed. The group was forced out of Wānā in southern Waziristan and then headed towards Mīr ‘Alī and Mīrānshāh. Tandhīm al-Qā’idah attempted to implore them to stand in the face of the brothers with bay’ah to the Islamic State, but the Tandhīm returned without success.

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They met with the Rūshin group and spoke with their amīr Hamīdullāh, as well as others from the group. They met the Uzbek group of Afghanistan. They met with the Tājīk brothers and their amīr ‘Abdul-Walīy. They met with Hājī Bashīr’s Uzbek group. They met with the Turkistānī brothers’ group. They met with the brother ‘Abdullāh ash-Shīshānī from the group belonging to the Islamic Emirate of Qawqāz in Mīrānshāh. They met with the allies of al-Qā’idah, the Haqqānī network, which represents the Emirate in Afghanistan – the Emirate of Mullā Muhammad ‘Umar. They met with some of the Tahrīk (Pakistan).

There wasn’t a single group except that they went to in order to alienate them from us and from the Islamic State and incite them against us. But their efforts failed. Rather, many of those whom they moved in pursuit of have either given bay’ah to the Islamic State or are on their way to doing so.

The Tandhīm met with the Afghanistan Emirate’s representative involved in recruiting spies for the Americans and for the Pakistani intelligence, Gud ‘Abdur-Rahmān, in an attempt to reconcile between Gud ‘Abdur-Rahmān and al-Qā’idah after a failed assassination attempt on Gud ‘Abdur-Rahmān. The fruit of this reconciliation was that they left together embracing one another after Gud ‘Abdur-Rahmān stated that his war is against those who wanted to kill him, and he wasn’t referring to Tandhīm al-Qā’idah. Rather, he was referring to the Tandhīm’s former Security Committee, which had been expelled by the Tandhīm and had given bay’ah to the Islamic State.

Tandhīm al-Qā’idah received a representative of Ansār al-Islam [of Iraq] for the purpose of a joint operation in Iraq with the Tandhīm against the Islamic State. The Tandhīm began facilitating for the representative to meet with Kurdish members of Tandhīm al-Qā’idah and bring them down from the mountain to the city of Mīrānshāh for counsel and planning. This counsel and planning was in order to gather Kurdish personnel – both military and shar’ī – from the Tandhīm to assist them in training inside Afghanistan so as to operate in Iraq after passing through Iran. They produced a video for them called “Mullā Ghāzī ‘Abdir-Rashīd Training Camp.” Mullā Ghāzī was killed at the hands of Pakistani forces in Islamabad. We consider him to be from amongst the shuhadā’, and Allah is his final judge. Allah made their plot futile, for Ansār al-Islam declared their bay’ah to the Islamic State. And the great conquests that Allah granted to the Islamic State in Mosul and elsewhere were but a cause that thwarted the Tandhīm’s plot.

And, indeed, my heart was cooled when I used to remember the group of truthful Punjābīs who left Tandhīm al-Qā’idah, leaving behind what remained of the Tandhīm to be played around with by adh-Dhawāhirī and the group of Sufi Punjābīs headed by the two Deobandis ‘Āsim ‘Umar and Ahmad Fārūq. They are the ones to whom the Tandhīm handed over the nerve center of the organization, Sahāb Media in the Urdu language, corrupting all that was left. The Tandhīm’s engineer, Mukhtār al-Maghribī – the link between the Tandhīm and the two Punjābī Deobandis – turned Tandhīm al-Qā’idah into a Deobandi Tandhīm under the name “Tandhīm al-Qā’idah in the Lands of India.” [Editor’s Note: This testimony was written by the author before the announcement of the Indian branch of the Tandhīm. He saw the announcement coming based upon information he had beforehand. See in this issue “The Qā’idah of adh-Dhawāhirī, al-Harārī, and an-Nadhārī, and the Absent Yemeni Wisdom,” as it contains a statement from the Emirate – which the Tandhīm claims to belong to – conflicting with the so-called “expansion” of the Tandhīm.] And they shunned muhājir personnel, not feeling themselves in need of them.

O Allah, bring an end to any project waging war against the Islamic State. O Allah, tear apart any such projects and exterminate them. I ask Allah the Mighty, Lord of the noble throne, to preserve our State and support it, to guide the steps of its amīr upon the truth, to raise its banner high, and to allow us to trample with our feet all those who show us enmity and wage war against our religion. Indeed, He is Mighty and the One who hears du’ā’.

And our final call is Praise be to Allah, the Lord of creation.

Your brother, the seeker of good – and Allah knows all intentions,

Abū Jarīr ash-Shamālī 19 Shawwāl 1435 AH (15 August 2014)

[Taken from Dabiq issue 6 pgs 40-55]

THE QĀ’IDAH OF ADH-DHAWĀHIRī, AL-HARĀRĪ, AND AN-NADHĀRĪ, AND THE ABSENT YEMENī WISDOM

By Abū Maysarah ash-Shāmī

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All praise belongs to Allah, the Lord of all creation, the final outcome is in favor of the pious, and there is no enmity except towards the transgressors. May Allah bestow peace and blessings upon the seal of the prophets and messengers, Muhammad, and upon all his family and companions. As for what follows:

The truthful and trusted one – Muhammad (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) – said, “The people of Yemen have come. They have the softest of hearts. Īmān is Yemenī, fiqh is Yemenī, and wisdom is Yemenī” [Reported by al-Bukhārī and Muslim on the authority of Abū Hurayrah].

Al-Hāfidh Ibn Rajab al-Hanbalī (rahimahullāh) said:

“Reflect on the statement of the Prophet (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) ‘Īmān is Yemenī, fiqh is Yemenī, and wisdom is Yemenī.’ He said this in praise of the people of Yemen and their virtues. Thus, he attested to their fiqh and īmān, and attributed this to them due to their having reached the highest degrees of fiqh, īmān, and wisdom. And we do not know of any group from amongst the Muslims who are less in speech than the people of Yemen or are less argumentative than them, whether from the early or later generations. Thus, he indicated that the knowledge and fiqh praised by Allah is the knowledge of Allah that leads one to love Him and be loved by Him, and to honor and revere Him, along with the knowledge that one requires of His commands and prohibitions. This was the case with the scholars of Yemen in the past, such as Abū Mūsā al-Ash’arī, Abū Muslim al-Khawlānī, Uways al-Qaranī and others, without getting into anything beyond that knowledge such as pitting the statements of the people against each other and excessively searching for their faults and slip-ups […] as well as excessively searching for the unnecessary aspects of sciences that do not benefit one’s religious adherence, that serve to distract one from Allah and from being preoccupied with Him, that harden one’s heart towards His dhikr, and that cause the experts of such sciences to desire a high position and leadership of the people. None of this is praiseworthy, and indeed the Prophet (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) used FEATURE  to seek refuge from knowledge that does not benefit [Reported by Muslim on the authority of Zayd]. In a hadīth reported from him he said, ‘Ask Allah for beneficial knowledge and seek refuge with Allah from knowledge that does not benef it’ [Reported by Ibn Mājah on the authority of Jābir]. In another hadīth reported from him he said, ‘Indeed, from knowledge is to be ignorant of some things’ [Reported by Abū Dāwūd on the authority of Buraydah]. The Prophet (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) disliked excessive and extensive speech, and loved concise speech. There are many ahādīth reported from him to that effect and they would take long to mention” [Majmū’ Rasā’il Ibn Rajab].

He (rahimahullāh) also said, “Ibn Mas’ūd also said, ‘You live in a time in which there are many scholars and few speakers, and there will come a time after you in which there will be few scholars and many speakers.’ Therefore, he who has extensive knowledge and speaks little is praiseworthy, and he who is the opposite is blameworthy. The Prophet (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) attested to the people of Yemen having īmān and fiqh. The people of Yemen are the least in speech from amongst the people and the least excessive in knowledge because their knowledge is beneficial knowledge in their hearts, and they only express with their tongues what they need to of that knowledge. And that is true fiqh and beneficial knowledge” [Fadl ‘Ilm as-Salaf].

After reading “Fadl ‘Ilm as-Salaf ‘Alā ‘Ilm alKhalaf” by al-Hāfidh Ibn Rajab (rahimahullāh), his statement “The people of Yemen are the least in speech from amongst the people” stuck to my mind for years. I then witnessed it in reality firsthand in the bay’āt announced by the mujāhidīn of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen, Sinai, Libya, and Algeria, for the shortest of the five statements was the statement of the mujāhidīn of Yemen. It contained wisdom, fiqh and īmān, and through it, they expressed their full convict ion in a brief and concise manner. I ask Allah to make them firm upon their covenant so that they meet Allah while He is pleased with them.

The mujāhidīn of Yemen said, “Allah’s Messenger (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) had given us glad tidings of Khilāfah upon the methodology of prophethood. And indeed, by Allah, we have seen it as a Khilāfah upon the methodology of prophethood. And when we heard the trumpets of the Jews and Christians – the callers upon the gates of Hellfire – we answered the order of Allah’s Messenger that obliged sticking to the jamā’ah of the Muslims and their Imām, for Hudhayfah (radiyallāhu ‘anh) said, ‘The people used to ask Allah’s Messenger (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) about good, and I used to ask him about evil, fearing that it might overtake me…’ In the hadīth, he says, ‘Is there any evil after this good?’ He responded, ‘Yes, callers upon the gates of Hellfire. Whoever answers them will be thrown into it by them.’ He said, ‘O Allah’s Messenger, describe them to me.’ He said, ‘They are from our skin and speak with our tongues.’ He said, ‘So what do you order me with if I reach that time?’ He said, ‘Stick to the jamā’ah of the Muslims and their Imām’ [Al-Bukhārī and Muslim].”

Thus, they recognized the disease – splitting and differing – and they knew the cure – unity and rallying together. They understood that rallying together meant sticking to the jamā’ah of the Muslims (the Khilāfah) and their Imām (the Khalīfah), not rallying together upon factionalism and partisanship. So they spoke with the prophetic wisdom, and said “we hear and obey” without any reluctance, complication, or arrogance.

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Others meanwhile, said, “we hear and disobey,” and their hearts absorbed the calf of partisanship because of their arrogance… And they made complications with their excessive speech just as the Children of Isrā’īl made complications when they were ordered to slaughter a cow. They were deceptive concerning the commands and prohibitions, claiming partisanship to be the rope of Allah that we were commanded to hold firmly to, and claiming the Khilāfah to be the disunion that we were prohibited from!

Such was the response of Hārith an-Nadhārī to the soldiers of the Islamic State in Yemen and to the Imām of the Muslims, Khalīfah Ibrāhīm – may Allah preserve him, set right his opinion, guide his aim, and by him break the strength of the apostates, the crusaders, the innovators, and the rebellious. Thus, an-Nadhārī emulated al-Jawlānī with his cunning praise, al-Harārī with his disparaging insinuations (that is, before their open display of spite, envy, enmity, and hatred), Abū ‘Abdullāh ash-Shāmī with his excessive speech, longwinded statements, categorizations, philosophizing, and spitefulness, and adh-Dhawāhirī with his contradictions …{ Adh-Dhawāhirī called to bay’ah for the Islamic State since its establishment in Iraq, and now he is amongst its most ardent opponents.}

So an-Nadhārī was not like the soldiers of Yemen. Rather, he rambled on in his hollow state ment and interpreted the speech of the Khalīfah in the worst possible manner. The portion of Amīrul-Mu’minīn’s statement that concerned the dissolving of parties and the current situation in Yemen did not exceed one minute in length. Hārith an-Nadhārī, however, responded with a statement that was half an hour long, following the example of Abū Abdullāh ash-Shāmī who took the book “al-Kabā’ir” (The Major Sins) and made its chapters into title headings for his statement in support of the sahwāt against the Islamic State as follows: Firstly, Secondly, Thirdly… Eighteenth… Firstly, Secondly, Thirdly… Firstly, Secondly, Thirdly… and so on…

The unfortunate thing is that some of his expressions trickle with blood, forebode evil, and contain wickedness, such as his statement, “And we hold them responsible for what may result – from being biased towards certain opinions and overstepping the boundaries of ijtihād – of unlawful bloodshed committed under the pretext of expansion and spreading the authority of the State. And we emphasize that we do not initiate aggression or fighting against any Muslim, nor do we deem their women or wealth to be lawful!”

I say, it’s as if he’s saying, “The Islamic State deems the women of the Muslims to be lawful!” So how strange are the heedless ones who rejoiced in his statement, “the noble shaykh – may Allah preserve him,” and in others, and forgot that al-Jawlānī began his first statement after the announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and Shām with cunning praise for Amīrul-Mu’minīn, his soldiers, and his State, without displaying such blatant spitefulness. From amongst that which al-Jawlānī stated was, “Then, Allah (‘azza wa jall) honored me with becoming acquainted with Shaykh al-Baghdādī, that venerable shaykh who fulfilled the rights of the people of Shām and repaid the debt multifold.”

So if an-Nadhārī’s beginning was with words that trickle with blood, let not anyone think that an-Nadhārī’s end will be any better than al-Jawlānī’s, except if Allah has mercy upon him. We ask Allah (jalla wa ‘alā) to guide him and his companions to stick firmly to the Imām.
Furthermore, an-Nadhārī fell into a bizarre contradiction, for he emphasized his affiliation with his amīr, adh-Dhawāhirī, who doesn’t make takfīr of the Rāfidah to begin with. And if adhDhawārī were to consider making takfīr of them, he wouldn’t “make takfīr” of them except for one justification: supporting America in their aggression towards the Muslims.

Adh-Dhawāhirī said, “My position concerning the laymen of the Shī’ah is the position of the scholars of Ahlus-Sunnah {The position he claims is not accurately attributable to Ahlus-Sunnah. First, the major scholars of Ahlus-Sunnah have expressed their takfīr of the Rāfidī Shī’ah as individuals. Shaykh Abū Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī (rahimahullāh) said, “The statements from the Salaf declaring the kufr of the Rāfidah are so profuse. Amongst what has been narrated from Imām Ahmad (rahimahullāh) is what al-Khallāl narrated on the authority of Abū Bakr al-Marrūdhī. He said that he asked Abū ‘Abdillāh (Ahmad Ibn Hanbal) regarding the ruling of one who curses Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Ā’ishah. He replied, ‘I do not consider him to be upon Islam.’ […] Imām Ahmad Ibn Yūnus – whom Imām Ahmad Ibn Hanbal praised, saying to someone, ‘Go to Ahmad Ibn Yūnus, for he is Shaykhul-Islām’ – said, ‘If a Jew slaughtered a sheep and a Rāfidī slaughtered a sheep, I would eat the sheep slaughtered by the Jew not by the Rāfidī, because the Rāfidī is a murtadd from Islam’” [Hal Atāka Hadīthur-Rāfidah]. In his different messages, Shaykh az-Zarqāwī also quotes Imām Mālik, ash-Shāfi’ī, al-Bukhārī, al-Firyābī, al-Lālikā’ī, Ibn Hazm, as-Sam’ānī, and others from the early, later, and contemporary scholars to prove this ruling upon the Rāfidah.

Second, ignorance is not an absolute excuse. Imām Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdil-Wahhāb (rahimahullāh) said, “What you mentioned […] regarding your doubting the condition of these tawāghīt and their followers and whether or not the proof has been established on them, then this is strange! How can you doubt this after I have clarified it to you over and over? For the person who the proof has not been established on is the newcomer to Islam and the person raised in a distant nomadic land, or when the matter is obscure […] then takfīr is not made upon him until he is informed of the matter. As for the principles of the religion, which Allah clarified and explicated in His book, then the proof of Allah is the Qur’ān, so whoever the Qur’ān reaches has received the proof” [Ar-Rasā’il ash-Shakhsiyyah]. Worshipping Allah alone is from the fundamental principles of the religion explicitly explained in the Qur’ān, not an obscure matter that a Muslim could ever be ignorant of. Whereas the Rāfidah worship the dead, belie the Qur’ān, and curse the wives and companions of the Prophet (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam)! So how can one claim they are “ignorant Muslims!?”} , and that is that they are excused due to their ignorance.

As for those of them who take part with their leaders in their cooperation with the crusaders and their aggression towards the Muslims, their ruling then is the ruling of a faction resisting the laws of Islam.{Note: Some longtime jihād claimants never used to consider factions resisting the basis of Sharī’ah (al-Hākimiyyah) to be apostates, let alone fact ions resisting a single ruling (hukm) from the Sharī’ah! Amongst them were leaders of “al-Jamā’ah al-Islāmiyyah” of Egypt whom adh-Dhawāhirī described – following their entrance into the democratic process – as “the noble brothers… brothers of manhaj, ‘aqīdah, and hardship…” And it appears from adh-Dhawāhirī’s statements quoted in the next few paragraphs of this article that he makes takfīr of factions resisting the basis of Sharī’ah, but not its individual members. As for his opinion concerning factions resisting only some shar’ī laws, what’s derived from the collection of his opinions on takfīr is that he does not make takfīr of such factions… The madhhab of the Salaf though is crystal clear, for the Sahābah had consensus on making takfīr of those who resisted paying the zakāh – and zakāh is from amongst the shar’ī laws – and fought them because of their apostasy. Shaykhul-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah (rahimahullāh) said, “The Sahābah did not say ‘Do you acknowledge that it’s obligatory or do you deny its ruling?’ This wasn’t known from the Khulafā’ and the Sahābah. Rather, as-Siddīq said to ‘Umar (radiyallāhu ‘anh), ‘By Allah! If they were to prevent from me what they used to pay to Allah’s Messenger (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) even if but a rope for tying a camel or a young she-goat, I would fight them because of their resistance to paying it.’ So he made their resistance to payment the basis for the permissibility of fighting them, not their denial of its obligation. It was reported that a group from amongst them used to acknowledge its obligation but were stingy in paying it, but in spite of this the Khulafā’ dealt with them all in the same manner: killing their fighters, enslaving their families, taking their wealth as ghanīmah, and testifying that their fighters are in Hellfire. And they labeled them all ‘ahl ar-riddah’ (the people of apostasy)” [ad-Durar as-Saniyyah: vol. 9, pg. 418].}

As for those of their laymen who have not taken part in any aggression towards the Muslims, nor fought under the banner of the global crusade, our approach with them is to make da’wah, expose the realities, and clarify the extent of the crimes committed by their leaders against Islam and the Muslims” [al-Liqā’ al-Maftūh – al-Halqat al-Ūlā].

Likewise, adh-Dhawāhirī does not make takfīr of the supporters of the tawāghīt, except for those officers who torture Muslims and belong to some specific departments of National Security. He said:

“The officers in the Counter-Religious Activism Department of National Security, who investigate religious issues and torture Muslims, I view them to be kuffār on an individual level, for they know even more about the Islamic movements than most of the members of these movements themselves. And it is permissible to kill National Security officers and all members of the police – regardless of whether you make takfīr of them on an individual level or you make takfīr of them on a general scale – if that occurs during the course of a campaign of fighting in which sniping them becomes a means for you to cause damage to them for the benefit of the jihād. This is because a resistant apostate faction is fought as one. It is permissible to kill those of them who are fleeing, and to finish off those of them who are wounded; and this would be an act of killing one whose individual condition was unknown. This is the rule because distinguishing the condition of individuals is done if they are maqdūr ‘alayhim (under the power of Muslims); these individuals are not maqdūr ‘alayhim. So the obligatory defensive jihād is not to be disrupted for the sake of distinguishing the condition of individuals” [al-Liqā’ al-Maftūh – al-Halqat al-Ūlā].

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He also said, “Making takfīr of the armies and the security institutions is an issue that requires elaboration. My view is that the officers in the Counter-Religious Activism Department of Nat ional Security and their likes, who investigate Muslims and torture them, are kuffār on an individual level. The result of the differing on the issue is very minute and is limited to personal rulings, such as marriage and inheritance. However, from the practical perspective regarding fighting them, there is no difference between the two views. And there is room for differing on the issue” [al-Liqā’ al-Maftūh – al-Halqat al-Ūlā].

So worshipping domes and supporting the constitution – in adh-Dhawāhirī’s view – is not something that makes a person a kāfir. As for torturing Muslims and transgressing against them in support of the crusaders or as a member of the “Counter-Religious Activism Department,” then that is a different matter…

So how does an-Nadhārī make takfīr of the Rāfidah and the army without the elaboration of adh-Dhawāhirī? { Adh-Dhawāhirī differentiates between a faction and its individual members when it comes to the label of kufr and some of its corresponding rulings. This differentiation is in opposition to the ijmā’ of the Salaf concerning factions that have rallied together upon kufr, such as supporting shrines and constitutions. Shaykh Abū Jandal al-Azdī (may Allah free him) said, “The Sahābah (radiyallāhu ‘anhum) had consensus on the kufr of the followers and supporters of both Musaylamah al-Kadhdhāb and Tulayhah al-Asadī. Likewise, they had consensus on the kufr of those who resisted paying the zakāh and dealt with them all in the same manner, for they took their wealth as ghanīmah, enslaved their women, and testified that their fighters are in Hellfire, and this is their takfīr towards them on an individual level” [Al-Āyāt Wal-Ahādīth alGhazīrah ‘Alā Kufr Quwwāt Dar’ al-Jazīrah].

So regarding an individual member of such a faction, “we rule upon him that he is a kāfir on an individual level, and we apply on him all the rulings of kufr including disavowing him, declaring it harām to initiate the greeting of salām to him, prohibiting him from marrying Muslim women, not praying on him if he dies, prohibiting his burial in the graveyards of the Muslims, and declaring [the spilling of] his blood permissible whether in battle or outside of it” [as stated by Shaykh ‘Abdul-’Azīz at-Tuwayli’ī – may Allah free him]. The practical difference between the opinion of adh-Dhawāhirī and the stance of the Islamic State becomes apparent in the severity and harshness adopted in the policies and methods of war.

However, if the apostasy emerges within the leadership of a Muslim faction that was originally formed for a shar’ī purpose, such as jihād in the cause of Allah, then the differentiation might have a correct basis initially until the proof can be established on the followers (who remained ignorant of the leadership’s condition after it had changed). However, they are fought collectively on account of their forceful resistance, until there is no more fitnah and the religion is completely for Allah.}
Would he disobey his amīr whom he tried to defend, claiming that he never went astray! {Adh-Dhawāhirī does not make takfīr of the parliamentary “Islamists” nor the Rāfidī Majūs (Magians).} And how can he call to waging war against the Houthis when this goes against the Dhawāhirī directives that he was ordered to adhere to and as a result of which the evil of the Houthis and the new tāghūt in Yemen became exacerbated!

The fact is that the policy outlined in “Tawjīhāt ‘Āmmah lil-’Amal al-Jihādī,” (General Guidelines for Jihādī Action) authored by adh-Dhawāhirī, is built on this differentition between  faction taken as a whole and its individual members, in spite of his claim that on  practicl level there’s no difference between the two opinions. For if one were to determine that there are “Muslims” present in that faction’s ranks, and were to widen for them the scope of excuse to include being ignorant of the very basis of the religion, he would be forced sooner or later, and whether or not he relized it, to “hesitte” and “be precautious.” So he wouldn’t target the aposttes for fear of killing “Muslims who have  misinterpretation.” This is clear from some of his statements and expressions, such as, “And if a group that attributes itself to Islam becomes involved in fighting alongside the kāfir enemy, it is to be repelled with the least amount of force required to fend off its aggression, as a means of closing the door to fitnah between the Muslims or harming those who did not take part with the enemy” [Tawjīhāt ‘Āmmah lil-’Aml al-Jihādī].

The effects of this ‘aqīdah – which at first saw no difference between making takfīr of a faction collectively and making takfīr of its individual members – have become apparent on a practicle level in the politics of war. And it’s not, as some heedless individuals think, that the organiztion’s policy is purely  military strategy. Rather, the reality is that they refrain from killing those whom they fear may be from the Muslims, whether soldiers of the tāghūt or Rāfidī Majūs!

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And it has reached me from thiqāt (reliable sources) in Yemen that an-Nadhārī used to argue to excuse the Houthis and would not decisively make takfīr of them because they were “Zaydī.” Then, after many objections were made, he began saying that they’re a “resistant faction” without making takfīr of them. Then he made takfīr of them on a general scale – without making takfīr of their individual members – on account of their resistance, not because they commit major shirk and make takfīr of the Sahābah (due to the possibility that their individual members are ignorant!) This is the position of most of the organization’s “senior shar’ī leaders” in Yemen. For this reason, they would avoid targeting the Houthis except after their evil recently became exacerbated and they took control of the lands and shed the blood of Allah’s slaves. And the soldiers of Ali Abdullah Saleh and Abd Rabbuh, according to them, are either excused due to misinterpretation, or coerced… or apostates… And they don’t fight them on the grounds that they support a tāghūt that is ruling by manmade constitutions. Rather, they fight them only for supporting the crusaders against the Muslims, claiming that there is less doubt in the latter of these two pretexts. This is in accordance with adh-Dhawārī’s tradition: torturing Muslims and supporting the crusaders is kufr that is inexcusable (but according to his “Tawjīhāt,” it’s excusable if the group attributes itself to Islam!) As for worshipping the dead and supporting the tāghūt, then it’s kufr and ignorance that’s excusable. Because of these deviations they never have a problem cooperating with sahwah-like gangs (the “Islāh” party and the “Hajūrī” followers) against the Houthis… in the cause of Allah! Or so they claim… And being accommodating towards this kind of cooperation is what led al-Jawlānī’s Front to the situation they’re now in, whereby their cooperation developed into trust, affection, and flattery, and then into supporting the sahwāt of Āl Salūl (the “Islamic” Front) and the Syrian Nat ional Coalition{ “Jayshul-Mujāhidīn,” “Jabhat Thuwwār Sūriyā,” “Liwā Thuwwār ar-Raqqah,” the FSA Military Councils (those that formed “Mishmish” for example)… are all sponsored by and connected to the apostate Syrian National Council. See, for example, pages 24-25 of issue #2 of Dābiq for the relationship between “Jayshul-Mujāhidīn” and the SNC Defense Minister.} against the Islamic State…

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Also from amongst what has reached me from thiqāt in Yemen is that “Ansār ash-Sharī’ah” in the “province” of al-Jawf fight side-by-side with the apostate army (the army of “the Arab Spring” – the army of Abd Rabbuh) and the Bankrupt Brotherhood against the Houthis, and that the f ighters are transported between the frontlines in the vehicles of the apostate army. Even their supplies are from the ammunition and food from the camps of the apostate army… Wallāhul-musta’ān… (It’s also reached me from thiqāt in Yemen that the organization’s leadership in Yemen is regretful about the period of consolidation during which they administered the areas that they took control of in Abyan and elsewhere for close to a year, to the extent that one of them said, “If we had taken the wealth and effort that we spent administering these areas and applied them towards recruitment and purchasing weapons, it would have been more beneficial for us.” So they fell into the delusion that there’s conflict between defensive jihād and partial consolidat ion that Allah grants to the mujāhidīn in order to implement His law.)

Going back to an-Nadhārī, who is blinded by his spite, and so he didn’t understand the meaning of Amīrul-Mu’minīn’s statement, “Indeed, the Rāfidah are a forsaken nation. If they had found muwahhidīn to fight them, their evil would not have become exacerbated.” I say, seeking Allah’s help, the meaning is that if these Rāfidah had found muwahhidīn to fight them whereby the muwahhidīn initiate the fighting and do not adhere to the policy in “General Guidelines for Jihādī Action,” their evil would not have become exacerbated. He did not deny the prior existence of “Dhawāhirī-style” fighting treating the Houthis as a Muslim faction that is to be fought with the least amount of force required to repel its aggression, meaning purely defensive fighting containing no harshness or severity, such that those of them fleeing are not pursued, those of them wounded are not f inished off, those of them taken prisoner are not killed, and their gatherings are not targeted with large-scale assaults… Wallāhul-musta’ān.

And when an-Nadhārī came out and made takf īr of the Houthis, the main factor that pushed him to do so was political. He was forced to go against his amīr, adh-Dhawāhirī, with this takfīr, for indeed the soldiers would not follow him if he persisted with his false opinions that led to the evil of the Rāfidah and the secularists becoming exacerbated…

And if someone were to object and bring some old statements from some of their leaders or some of their prominent shuhadā’, or ment ioned some old operations against the apostates that were carried out in the same manner as the Islamic State, operations which were suddenly stopped until the apostates were able to take control of the rule in Yemen, (it’s also reached me from thiqāt in Yemen that some of these daring operations were personal init iatives carried out without the leadership’s approval, and those who ordered them were disciplined but the organization was forced to claim responsibility for them), then I say, after “the Arab Spring” began and some prominent leaders of al-Qā’idah attained shahādah, there emerged unwise guidelines and policies from adh-Dhawāhirī, al-Amrīkī, al-Bāshā, and Husām ‘Abdur-Ra’ūf (author of the book “If I Were in the Place of Morsi and Sat on the Kursī [Chair]”!) in Khurāsān. Meanwhile, an-Nadhārī and his likes in Yemen exposed what they had concealed of desires in their hearts all these long years. So it was as if they were made for each other, and adh-Dhawāhirī’s guidelines were fully implemented, placing Yemen beneath the feet of the Rāfidah and the new tāghūt, wallāhul-musta’ān.

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It should be noted that the statements of alQā’idah in Yemen “in support” of the Islamic State were only made due to many objections from the soldiers and leaders (not including the top-level leadership) concerning the “neutrality” of al-Qā’idah in Yemen and its “Dhawāhirīness.” And when the wilāyah was formed in coordination with the Islamic State – and this was done before the official announcement of the wilāyah and with the knowledge of the organization in Yemen, which had been informed about the initiative of expansion – those upon the manhaj raced to give bay’ah to the Islamic State. Then, some of the irresolute wanted to retract their bay’ah to the Islamic State due to some personal desires, but only on condition that the organization in Yemen pronounces the Islamic State innocent of any accusation of extremism, supports it in its war against the crusaders, and acknowledges it’s shar’ī legality, so that they don’t fall into embarrassment in front of their followers. So the organization’s leadership in Yemen wrote the recent statement “of support” (before an-Nadhārī’s announcement), whereas the previous statements feigned ignorance of the Islamic State’s presence in the midst of the tremendous events taking place in Iraq and Shām. Some of these statements contained criticism of its official spokesperson, Shaykh al-‘Adnānī, through derisive insinuations without explicitness, after the Shaykh clarified the deviation of adh-Dhawāhirī’s manhaj. Some of these statements also contained tarahhum (saying “rahimahullāh”) for the apostates of the Salūlī sahwāt (the leaders of Ahrār ash-Shām). So why does the organization not make tarahhum for Abū ‘Abdir-Rahmān alBīlāwī, Abū Bakr al-‘Irāqī, and Abū Usāmah alMaghribī – rahimahumullāh?

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Lastly, may Allah not bless al-Qā’idah’s alleged bay’ah to Mullā ‘Umar. Has Mullā ‘Umar who made du’ā’ for Hamd and Tamīm Āl Thānī and “advised” the “Muslim rulers” (the tawāghīt) through his own tongue as well as the tongue of his emirate…{ The Emirate stated, “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan calls on the Muslim rulers of these nations to enter into an Islamic coalition in defense of al-Masjid al-Aqsā as opposed to defending American interests, and to shoulder their Islamic and moral responsibilities for the sake of stopping the aggression of the Jews towards the first qiblah of the Muslims. It is incumbent on the rulers of the Islamic nations to set aside their differences and shoulder the responsibility of defending al-Masjid al-Aqsā [The Statement of the Emirate of Afghanistan Concerning the Aggression of the Zionist Occupation Towards al-Masjid al-Aqsā].

Mullā ‘Umar said, “Likewise, we specifically thank His Excellency, the amīr of Qatar, Shaykh Tamīm Ibn Hamd Ibn Khalīfah Āl Thānī for his sincere efforts and his successful role as an intermediary in securing the release of the aforement ioned leaders and for hosting them. I ask Allah to grant His Excellency a beautiful compensation in the worldly life and a tremendous reward in the hereafter” [A Message of Congratulations on the Release of Jihādī Leaders from Guantanamo Prison].

The Emirate also stated, “And it should be mentioned that we present our thanks and regards to our sister-nation Qatar and to its respected amīr, His Highness Shaykh Hamd Ibn Khalīfah Āl Thānī – may Allah preserve him – for having agreed to the opening of a political office for the Islamic Emirate in his country, and for graciously providing the facilities related to it” [A Statement Concerning the Opening of A Political Office for the Emirate of Afghanistan in the State of Qatar].}

has he permitted them to operate outside the modern-day borders of Afghanistan against the “Muslims rulers,” the “neighboring countries,” the “countries of the region,” and the “nations of the world?” {Mullā ‘Umar denies any intent of conducting operations or expanding outside the modern-day borders of Afghanistan defined by the crusaders, so the claim by al-Qā’idah’s various branches of having bay’ah to him is from the worst kind of falsehood.

From amongst the things that Mullā ‘Umar has stated is, “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan seeks to establish mutual relations with the world, and specifically with the Islamic world and the neighboring countries in an atmosphere of mutual respect and mutual interests in the light of Islamic teachings and our national interests. It does not seek to meddle in the affairs of others and does not allow others to meddle in its affairs. The Islamic Emirate assures the world that it will not allow anyone to use its soil against others, and likewise openly declares that it respects all international laws and treaties in the light of the teachings of the Islamic religion and our national interests. We congratulate the governments that emerged after the revolutions as well as the Arab peoples on their new lives and state of affairs, and we make du’ā’ for them to have progress, a bright future, and adherence to Islamic teachings in their lives” [A Statement on the Occasion of the Blessed Eid al-Fitr in the Year 1433 AH].

The Emirate also stated, “The Islamic Emirate seeks to interact with the nations of the world and the countries of the region on the basis of bilateral cooperat ion and mutual respect. The Islamic Emirate did not harm anyone before, nor does it harm anyone now, nor will it do so in the future. Likewise, it does not allow anyone to use Afghan soil against others” [The Text of the Emirate’s Declaration at the Research Conference in France].}

Or does he repeatedly deny any initiative to conduct operations outside Afghanistan in an effort to appease the “internat ional community?” Furthermore, how is it that the Emirate calls for bilateral relations based on mutual respect and neighborly relations with India,{The official spokesperson of his emirate stated, “Recently, some of the countries in the region – India, China and Russia – expressed concern that if American 24ARTICLE forces withdraw from Afghanistan and leave the region, the region would face a state of instability and the countries of the region would face threats from Afghanistan. We consider these types of concern to be an effect of the negative propaganda disseminated by the Western Intelligence-controlled media, and request that the countries of the region seek to ascertain the facts for themselves and issue statements in light of the actual state of affairs. The Islamic Emirate, in its role of accountability, assures everyone that no harm will come from Afghanistan to any of the countries in the region or any neighboring countries. We seek to establish security for our nation as well as the region” [Remarks by the Spokesperson of the Emirate Regarding the Concerns of Some of the Countries in the Region].}

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and then adh-Dhawāhirī comes and announces a branch of al-Qā’idah’s organization in India? And how is it that his Afghani Emirate calls for good relations with Rāfidī Iran, and an-Nadhārī calls to killing the Rāfidah?{ The Emirate stated, “So on this basis the Islamic Emirate, in light of its balanced and sensible foreign policy, established diplomatic relations based on the principles of mutual respect, equality, and not interfering in one another’s internal affairs with the countries of the region and the various parts of the world. It seeks to widen the sphere of its political relations, and likewise extend them to the rest of the world. Our relations with the Islamic nation of Iran is one link in this chain. Iran’s request and invitation, the visit made by the head of the Islamic Emirate’s political office with his delegation and assistant, and the positive talks held with Iranian officials are all a clear testament to the sound, sensible, balanced, and independent foreign policy of the Islamic Emirate. Furthermore, the efforts that the delegation made towards improving bilateral relations, and their discussion of the issue of Afghan immigrants all demonstrate that the primary and initial goal behind establishing relations with the nations of the world is only to fulfill the wishes and intents of the Afghan people and attain the highest interests of the nation as well as its security, and nothing more. Iran is an Islamic nation, it shares borders with Afghanistan, there are over 2 million Afghans living there, it is rich with oil and enjoys a good economy, it has a seacoast, and it’s an important nation on both a regional and global level. It is these interests that bring the two nations together and even force them to have good conduct with one another in the framework of public interests and good neighbor relations, and to maintain political, social and economic ties” [The Foreign Policy of the Emirate Represents the Highest Interests of the Nation].

The Emirate also stated, “Fārs News Agency published a news article revealing a visit made by a delegation of the Islamic Emirate to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Islamic Emirate confirms and supports this. Recently, a delegation led by the head of the Islamic Emirate’s political office made a three-day visit to the city of Tehran, the capital of Iran. The visit took place to discuss bilateral relations between both sides, and the delegation returned after discussing the aforementioned topics. […] During this visit, which took place on an official invitation from the Iranian government, the Islamic Emirate was able to convey the voice and the needs of the people and the mujāhidīn to the ears of the delegat ions of various nations of the world. They also provided information about the ongoing situation and held positive talks with senior officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran on various issues. […] We must also state that the Islamic Emirate has always sought to maintain relations with the countries of the region and the world within the framework of mutual respect, and has not ceased its efforts in that regard” [Al-Qārī Muhammad Yūsuf Ahmadī’s Remarks on the Visit Made by the Emirate’s Delegation to the Republic of Iran].

Mullā ‘Umar said, “It’s incumbent upon all Muslims to thwart all the cursed plots of the cunning enemy, and to not give him the opportunity to light the f ires of disagreement amongst the Muslims. A major component of American policy is to categorize the Muslims in Iraq with the labels of Shī’ah and Sunnī, and in Afghanistan with the labels of Pashtun, Tājīk, Hazārah and Uzbek, in order to decrease the severity and strength of the popular uprisings and the accompanying armed resistance. […] As such, I request the brothers in Iraq to put behind them the differences that exist in the name of Shī’ah and Sunnī, and to fight in unity against the occupying enemy, for victory is not possible without unity” [A Message to the Mujāhid People of Iraq and Afghanistan].

NOTE: Some muhājirīn who had been in Khurāsān for a long time informed me that there are senior commanders in Afghanistan and Waziristan who doubt that Mullā ‘Umar is still alive and are convinced that he was either killed or imprisoned, as none of them has seen him since the start of the modern crusader campaign against Afghanistan. They also quoted Mullā ‘Umar’s son as saying that he had not seen him for 12 years. Therefore, it’s possible that these expressions containing clear deviation from the truth came from someone other than him. Even if one sees within his old messages a precedent for the statements attributed to him recently, they weren’t to the same extent of wrong. Wallāhul-musta’ān.} Is the claim of having bay’ah to Mullā ‘Umar based in Yemeni wisdom or jāhilī partisanship? They should let go of it, for it is rotten…

If not, then – by Allah – they will become like the leaders and dignitaries of the Children of Isrā’īl. For indeed, there has come to them the Khilāfah upon the methodology of prophethood, and with it those who broke off from their tribes – the muhājirīn who immigrated to the land that Ibrāhīm immigrated to. The angels have spread their wings for them and over their State… But the partisans opposed them… continuing along their path to history’s trash bin… unless Allah wills otherwise…

Allah’s help is sought, upon Him we rely, and there is no might nor strength except by Him. He is sufficient for us, and the best disposer of affairs.

[Taken from Dabiq Magazine issue 6 pgs 16-25]